International Nuclear and Radiological - Latest Events
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| December 28th, 2025 22:45:40 EST -0500 Worker Exposure Caused by a Radiation-Generating Device In November 2024, a worker was exposed to radiation during the inspection of an X-ray device used for foreign object detection in manufactured products at a facility that produces and sells such devices. The worker was conducting performance improvement work on the device (80kV, 1.25mA) and, without turning off the power, inserted his hands into the machine to disassemble and reassemble the collimator, while X-rays were being continuously emitted. Since the device was still in the production phase, radiation warning lamp had not yet been properly installed. The worker continued the task without being aware that radiation was being emitted. Subsequently, localized radiation effects such as erythema and pain appeared on the worker's hand. According to the dose assessment, the equivalent dose to the skin on the worker’s hand was estimated to exceed 2,000 mSv, surpassing the annual dose limit. |
| December 28th, 2025 22:40:35 EST -0500 Worker Exposure Caused by a Radiation-Generating Device In May 2024, two workers at a semiconductor manufacturing company were exposed to radiation while inspecting an X-ray generator(60 kV, 100 mA) used for wafer thickness analysis. The workers were unaware that X-rays were being emitted and, in the process of identifying an malfunction of the device, they removed some components and inserted their hands into the machine to take photographs, during which they were exposed to radiation. The X-ray generator was a cabinet-type device equipped with an interlock system and warning lamp. However, due to a malfunction of the interlock system, radiation continued to be emitted despite the device being disassembled. Additionally, the warning lamp was too dim, making it difficult for the workers to recognize that radiation was being emitted. Both individuals exhibited non-lethal radiation injuries-including erythema, pain, and blistering of the hands. According to the dose assessment results, the equivalent skin doses by both workers exceeded the annual dose limit. |
| December 23rd, 2025 04:51:58 EST -0500 Worker Exceeded Annual Whole Body Dose Limit On 19.08.2025, an employee of a company carried out a non-destructive testing using a Se-75 source with an activity of 1.95 TBq. When winding back the source into its safety position in a tube, the source detached from its holder, so that the source remained in the collimator. When the radiation officer entered the bunker his electronic radiation protection dosimeter gave a warning signal. The radiation officer covered the tube and the collimator with several layers of lead. In total the worker stayed 10 seconds at a distance of 1 m close to the source. The monthly evaluation of the official dosimeter provided a value of 49.7 mSv for August 2025 exceeding the statutory annual whole body dose limit for workers. |
| December 9th, 2025 04:44:39 EST -0500 Isolating S8 building of Natanz facility Following our previous reports, in order to prevent dispersion of radioactive material inside the Natanz facility, taking into account the weather forecast, one of the building inside the facility (S8) has already been surrounded and isolated and is going to be covered with a water-resistant material. |
| November 27th, 2025 03:30:16 EST -0500 Radiation worker exposure exceeding 10 times the annual limit The museum in Roztoky near Prague operates an irradiation chamber that is used to destroy insects in collection items with gamma radiation. For this purpose, a sealed radionuclide source of Co-60 with an actual activity of 127 TBq on the date of the event is used. On 1. 9. 2025, a radiation worker was exposed to radiation by entering the irradiation chamber to bring another object into it for irradiation at a time when the emitter was extended in the working position and irradiation was taking place. The worker was moving in a field of ionizing radiation for about 1 to 2 minutes. The worker was equipped only with a personal film dosimeter, he left the operational dosimeter in the office. After closing the shielding door, he realized his mistake and reported the incident to his superior. After evaluating the personal film dosimeter that the worker was wearing, an effective dose of 320 mSv was determined, and no deterministic effects were observed. An inspection by SÚJB inspectors found that several negative factors coincided, which led to the worker's irradiation: 1. Due to a technical fault in the switch, the blocking of the shielding door was inoperative at the time when the IZ source was extended in the working position. This allowed the shielding door to the chamber to be opened during irradiation. 2. due to a switch malfunction, the light signaling the position of the emitter on the panel did not work, the worker did not notice this and thought that the source was not extended in the working position. 3. switching off the workplace monitoring system (switching off was carried out by the worker who was irradiated during the incident) 4. violation of the obligation to be equipped with a personal operational dosimeter. |
| October 7th, 2025 00:25:56 EDT -0400 Radiation worker exposure On 13. 1. 2025, the lcencee reported a radiation emergency when an unplanned radiation exposure of a radiation worker occurred. The worker was in the radiation room with a source of ionizing radiation - the Chisostat SO 1 irradiator, which contained a sealed radionuclide source ("URZ") Co-60 with an activity of 30TBq as of 13. 1. 2025. At the time of the preparatory work, the source was not in a shielded position. The total time the worker spent in the radiation room during 2 entries (7. 1. 2025 and 13. 1. 2025) was about 12.5 minutes. The investigation found that the last time the irradiator was used on 18. 12. 2024, it was incorrectly turned off. The irradiator was turned off by the main circuit breaker (not via the main control console), therefore the source was not put into the shielded position. It was also found that the backup power source (UPC), which would ensure the insertion of the source even in the event of an erroneous shutdown, was not functional. Before entering the radiation room, the worker did not use a portable dose rate meter in either case to verify the radiation situation, and was not equipped with a personal electronic dosimeter that would have alerted him to a non-standard situation (increased dose rate). No one else entered the radiationroom between 18. 12. 2024 and 13. 1. 2025. The total effective dose received by the radiation worker for both days (7. 1. 2025 and 13. 1. 2025) was estimated at 150 mSv. The equivalent dose to the radiation worker's hand was estimated at approximately 8 Sv. Deterministic effects (radiation dermatitis) have not yet been detected (within approximately 8 months of the event). The radiation emergency is still under investigation by SÚJB inspectors. During 06/2025, the irradiator experienced another malfunction, probably related to the age of the irradiator. Due to the suspicion of a stuck shielding block, the specialist company recommended that the irradiator be dismantled and taken out of service. |
| August 5th, 2025 10:23:31 EDT -0400 External contamination of a worker beyond the annual statutory limit to the skin On 12 June 2025, the operator of the Cattenom nuclear power plant reported a significant radiation protection event concerning the exceeding of an annual individual dose limit by an EDF contractor. On 9 June 2025, this contractor was installing lead matting in reactor building 3, which was shut down for partial inspection. During the check carried out at the exit of the controlled area, skin contamination was detected on the contractor's cheek. The worker was immediately taken into care and the radioactive particle causing the contamination was removed. The occupational physician assessed the dose received, taking into account the worker's activities within the reactor building. This assessment showed that the dose received by the worker's cheek exceeded the regulatory limit for the equivalent skin dose (500 mSv). As soon as the contamination was discovered, the operator took action to identify its source. However, radiological checks carried out in the premises where the agent was present did not reveal any particular anomalies. The ASNR carried out an on-site inspection on 13 June 2025, during which contamination checks were carried out on the premises, with negative results, and verification that EDF had taken all necessary measures to manage the event adequately and to analyse its causes. |
| August 5th, 2025 10:15:29 EDT -0400 External contamination of a worker beyond the annual statutory limit to the skin On 25 July 2025, the operator of the Gravelines nuclear power plant reported a significant radiation protection event concerning the exceeding of an annual individual dose limit by an EDF contractor. Reactor 1 at the Gravelines nuclear power plant was in shut down for maintenance and refuelling. During the night of 23 to 24 July, as part of radiographic testing of a pipe located in the reactor building, a worker was contaminated on the head. This contamination was detected at the exit of the reactor building during a radiological check. The worker was taken care of by the changing room attendant in order to remove the radioactive particles, and then by the site's medical service. The occupational physician carried out a conservative assessment of the dose received, taking into account the worker's activities within the reactor building. This assessment showed that the dose received by the worker's neck exceeded the regulatory limit for equivalent skin dose (500 mSv). As soon as the contamination was discovered, the operator took action to identify its source. However, radiological checks carried out in the premises where the agent was present did not reveal any particular anomalies. The ASNR carried out an on-site inspection on 28 July 2025 to verify that the operator had taken all necessary measures to manage the event adequately, analyse its causes and resume operations safely. During the inspection, contamination checks were carried out on the pipework involved in the activity, with negative results. |
| August 1st, 2025 04:45:00 EDT -0400 Localised irradiation of a worker's arm by the beam of a particle accelerator On 24 July 2025, the National Centre for Research and Restoration in French Museums (C2RMF) reported to the ASNR a significant radiation protection event related to the localised irradiation of a worker by the beam of the AGLAE particle accelerator, used for analysing works of art and ancient objects. The radiation caused an erythema at the beam impact point on the worker's arm, i.e. a first-degree radiation burn characterised by reddening of the skin, which is typical of a deterministic effect of ionising radiation. The worker was taken into care by his general health doctor and the occupational health doctor, with support from a specialist doctor from the reference regional health centre for nuclear and radiological risk and ASNR experts for dose reconstruction. The ASNR conducted an on-site inspection on 30 July 2025. This inspection examined the initial causes identified by the C2RMF, which include a malfunction of the safety control system required by the standards applicable to particle accelerators in industrial and research applications (NF M 62-105). Thus, the particle beam was not interrupted by the safety control system when the worker entered the experimental room. Furthermore, the inspection revealed that the radiation protection culture could be improved, particularly with regard to the prevention of risks associated with the particle accelerator. The inspection also made it possible to clarify the conditions under which the worker has been exposed, which will enable the ASNR to provide the associated physicians with a reconstruction of the received dose. Following the inspection on 30 July 2025 and the report of a significant radiation protection event, the C2RMF will have to submit to the ASNR a detailed analysis of the event, the root causes that led to the incident and the corrective actions taken and planned. It will also have to provide answers to the various requests made in the follow-up letter of the inspection. This follow-up letter is publicly available on ASNR website following a link to be found in the press release, but only in French. The ASNR will ensure that the facility meets back the safety standards and that the experience feedback is properly taken into account by the establishment. It will ensure that this feedback is shared both nationally and internationally, given the level of rating of this event on the INES scale. |
| July 17th, 2025 14:51:24 EDT -0400 Workers Exceeded Annual Dose Limit On April 8, 2025, two workers were performing waste handling activities in a hot cell basement of a cyclotron facility that produces strontium-82 from metallic rubidium targets. One worker removed a high-level liquid waste container from a shielded barrel and placed the unshielded container on the ground adjacent to the work area, where activities continued for approximately 15 minutes. Both workers’ electronic dosimeters alarmed for high dose soon after the container was removed from shielding; however, neither worker noticed these alarms because of the personal protective equipment they had donned, including respirators. Radiation surveys were performed upon entry to the area and prior to removing the container from shielding, but not again until after the workers left the area and noticed the excessive doses recorded on their electronic dosimeters. Radiation dose rates on contact with the waste container exceeded 9.99 Sv/hr (999 R/hr), which was the upper limit of available instrumentation. The licensee later determined that on the day of the event, the waste container contained over 7.77 TBq (210 Ci) of rubidium radionuclides. A dose reconstruction concluded that as a result of this event, Worker 1 received a total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) of 0.124 Sv (12.4 rem) and a shallow dose equivalent (SDE) of 2.4 Sv (240 rem) to the skin of the lower extremities, and that Worker 2 received a TEDE of 0.096 Sv (9.6 rem). The TEDE of both employees exceeded the U.S. regulatory limit for annual whole body dose of 0.05 Sv (5 rem). The SDE of Employee 1 exceeded the U.S. regulatory limit for annual dose to the skin of the extremities of 0.5 Sv (50 rem). EN57657 |
| June 21st, 2025 22:42:12 EDT -0400 Attacks on Natanz, Esfahan and Fordow Nuclear Facilities by the criminal United States of America Despite the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities and the fact that such actions contravene all international norms and principles of international law, the Natanz, Esfahan and Fordow nuclear facilities– which have been under continuous IAEA inspection and verification measures – were attacked by the criminal United States of America on June 22. Because of the sensitivity of information that may be used by the enemies, no information can be provided about the on-site condition. No increase in off-site radiation levels has been reported as of this time. Further investigation is still ongoing. |
| June 14th, 2025 01:55:54 EDT -0400 Several attacks by Zionist regime Despite the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities and the fact that such actions contravene all international norms and principles of international law, the Esfahan nuclear facilities – which have been under continuous IAEA inspection and verification measures – was attacked several times by the Zionist regime on June 13. Because of the sensitivity of information that may be used by the enemy, no information can be provided about the on-site condition. No increase in off-site radiation levels has been reported as of this time. Further investigation is still ongoing. |
| June 13th, 2025 00:29:07 EDT -0400 several missile attacks by Zionist regime of israel Despite the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities and the fact that such actions contravene all international norms and principles of international law, the Natanz nuclear facilities – which have been under continuous IAEA inspection and verification measures – was subjected to aerial and missile attacks by the Zionist regime from approximately 3:00 AM to 8:00 AM Iran Standard Time (IRST) on 13 June 2025. No increase in off-site radiation levels has been reported as of this time. Further investigation are still ongoing continuously. |
| March 19th, 2025 16:42:19 EDT -0400 Radiactive Waste Facility Taken Over On Sunday March the 2nd, 2025, at approximately 6:30 AM (UTC-06:00), personnel from the municipality of Temascalapa forcibly took over the Low and Medium Level Radioactive Waste Storage Center (CADER), property of the National Institute of Nuclear Research (ININ), evicting the personnel who were at the facility and subsequently placing seals of closure at the entrances. The video surveillance and environmental radiation monitoring systems that CADER has were disabled and there was no way to know the status inside the Center. Negotiations took place out between personnel from the government of the State of Mexico and the Municipality of Temascalapa, without reaching agreements so far. In addition to the radioactive material and depleted uranium that are kept in the facility, work tools from a foreign company were also retained inside it. Federal Authorities were working to regain control of the facility. The source term of the facility is estimated at approximately 1,041.55 TBq of Co-60 and its surface area is 16.2 HA On Thusrday March the 13th, 2025, people from the Comisión Nacional de Seguridad Nuclear y Salvaguardias (CNSNS) conducted two reconnaissance procedures at the CADER, one on safety and the other one on security. No abnormal conditions were detected during the safety inspection. Regarding the security inspection, the following were observed: • It was confirmed that no intrusion occurred in any of the three CADER radioactive waste warehouses. • Intentional damage was found to equipment related to CCTV, alarm systems, voice and data transmission, and other systems. According to the personnel from the ININ who attended the reconnaissance procedure, the extent of the damage was such that it was not possible to restore these systems during the procedure. Additionally, two CCTV cameras were removed and a third was disabled (covered with a plastic bag), all of which located in the security booth. • It was confirmed that personnel not associated with the facility broke into the CADER administrative offices. According to ININ staff, a solid-state storage drive containing sensitive CADER information was initially detected missing. The sabotage of the CADER's physical protection system left the facility in imminent risk (according to article 181 of Mexico's General Regulations on Radiological Safety), which is why the preventive and security measure consisting of securing the radioactive material stored in the CADER was executed, placing security seals at the entrances to the three warehouses for this purpose. Finally, on Friday March the 14th, 2025, after negotiations among the Federal, State and Municipal authorities, control of the CADER was returned to ININ (who is the owner and administrator of the facility), so the CADER is back under his owner control. |
| March 19th, 2025 16:10:00 EDT -0400 Lost Radiography Device On March 6, 2025, a radiography crew working approximately 16 km (10 mi) east of Mentone, Texas, reported losing a SPEC 150 exposure device containing a 3.53 TBq (95.4 Ci) iridium-192 source. Update: On March 13, 2025, a member of the public contacted the licensee stating they had found the exposure device. The device was recovered by and is in the possession of the licensee. The device had remained in a locked shed since being found. The exposure device was found to be intact and no attempt was made to operate or tamper with the device. Exposure levels were normal and no individual would have received any significant exposure due to this event. NRC EN57596 |







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